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Open Space Taxation and State
Constitutions
David A. Myers*
In the current drama of property tax reform, no one seems
quite sure which role to cast for state constitutions. California's
Proposition 131 will no doubt serve to shatpen the debate over the2
proper scope of constitutional limitations on the power of taxation.
Yet other, less dramatic developments in this area of the law also
merit close attention. In the last twenty-five years, for example,
almost half of the states have amended their fundamental law to
allow for differential taxation of farm, timber, and open space
land.' These provisions are designed to free the legislatures from
the restrictive uniformity clauses once thought necessary to ensure

an equitable distribution of the tax burden.' The legislatures responded in kind: more than forty states have adopted some form of
* Assistant Professor of Agricultural Law, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois. B.A., 1973, Drake University; J.D., 1976, Universityof Illinois College of
Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Richard Dees
and Ann Effinger, students at the University of Illinois College of Law.
1. CAL. CONoT. art. 13 A. The constitutionality of the amendment was upheld in
Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Gelfand, Seeking Local Government FinancialIntegrity Through Debt
Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the
Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MNN. L. Rev. 545 (1979). See also Keesling & Ajalat,
Proposition 13: The Revolution's Aftermath, 14 AssEssoR's J. 117 (1979).
3. The recent open space amendments, with the year of adoption in parentheses, include: ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 217 (1978); CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8 (1976); DEL. CONsT. art. 8,
§ 1 (1977); FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4(a) (1968); KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 12 (1976); Ky. CONST. §
172A (1969); LA. CONST. art. 7, § 18(C) (1974); ME. CONST. art. 9, § 8 (1973); MD. CONST.
Declaration of Rights, art. 43 (1960); MAss. CONST. Articles of Amendment, arts. 41 (forest
lands and recreational areas) (1978), 112 (1978); Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 7 (1976) (forest
lands); NEB. CoNST. art. 8, § 1 (1978); Nav. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (1974); N.H. CONST. art. 5b
(1968); N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1, lb (1963); Omo CONST. art. 2, § 36 (1974) (forest lands);
OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 8 (1972); PA. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (1973); TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 28
(1973); Tx. CoNST. art. 8, §§ 1-d (1966), 1-d-1 (1978); UTAH CONsT. art. 13, § 3 (1969); VA.
CONST. art. 10, § 2 (1971); WAsH. CONST. art. 7, § 11 (1968); Wi. CoNST. art. 8, § 1 (1974).
4. See Kelsey v. Colwell, 30 Cal. App. 3d 590, 595, 106 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (1973); City
of E. Orange v. Township of Livingston, 102 N.J. Super. 512, 531-34, 246 A.2d 178, 188-90
(1968).
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differential taxation for such areas.5
The paradox in this development is intriguing. The rigid uniformity provisions were originally designed to prevent legislative
abuses of the taxing power by demanding that all property be
taxed equally and at its true or full value.' The open space amendments carve out certain exceptions to these rules.7 At the same
time, however, the amendments confirm the continuing viability of
the concept of uniformity by allowing specific deviations from operation of the rules.' Thus, the open space amendments tend both to
countermand and to reinforce the ideal that absolute* equality in
state taxation can be attained.
In order to assess the impact of this development on state constitutional law, this Article will first examine the theoretical func-

i

5. Current citations to 43 of these programs can be found in the appendix to Malone &
Ayesh, Comprehensive Land Use Control Through Differential Assessment and Supplemental Regulation, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 432, 458-73 (1979). See generally Currier, An Analysis of
Differential Taxation as a Method of MaintainingAgricultural and Open Space Land Uses,
30 U. FLA. L. REV. 821 (1978); Keene, DifferentialAssessment and The Preservationof Open
Space, 14 UIw. L. ANN. 11 (1977). See also Myers, The Legal Aspects of Agricultural Districting, 55 IND. L.J. 1 (1979).
6. See generally W. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMIrry AND EQUALrrY iN STATE
TAXATION 609-42 (1959) [hereinafter cited as NEWHOUSEI]; Matthews, The Function of Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L.J. 31, 39-46 (1949).
7. See e.g., NEv. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the legislature may constitute agricultural and open-space real property having a greater value for another use than that for
which it is being used, as a separate class for taxation purposes and may provide a
separate uniform plan for appraisal and valuation of such property for assessment
purposes.
Id. See also WASH. CONST. art. 7, § 11.
8. See Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 426, 147 N.W.2d 633, 642-43
(1967).
The viability of the uniformity clause is attested to by the series of constitutional
amendments that have been necessary to avoid its proscriptions. In 1908, sec. 1, art.
VIII, was amended to permit income, privilege, and occupational taxes without regard
to the uniformity clause. In 1927, it was amended to make possible the separate taxation of forests and minerals. In 1941, came an amendment that permitted municipalities to collect and return taxes on real estate by optional methods, and, in 1961, the
inequality of taxing merchants' stock in trade and certain other personal property uniformly with general property was recognized, and the requirements of the section were
lifted in respect to the types of property specified. Without question these amendments
resulted from the recognition by the legislature and the people of the onerous strictures
of the constitutional requirement of uniformity.
The rigors of the uniformity clause have on occasion prevented the passage of socially desirable legislation; and to accomplish the ends sought, constitutional amendments permitting limited and defined exceptions to the rule have been enacted and
ratified. Its purpose, however, is as worthy as it is necessary. It is "to protect the citizen
against unequal, and consequently unjust taxation." Weeks v. Milwaukee (1860), 10
Wis. 186, 201 (*242, *257).
Id. See also Note, The Uniformity Clause, Assessment Freeze Laws, and Urban Renewal: A
CriticalView, 1965 Wis. L. Rav. 885, 891 n.34.
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tion and form of state constitutions. This analysis can in turn be
used to develop criteria for evaluating the content of these open
space amendments. These criteria can then be used to suggest alternative methods of constitutional change that will allow state
governments to respond most effectively to contemporary problems
in the taxation of real property.
I. DEFINING TuE FuNCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Conventional wisdom dictates that state constitutions should
be brief, confined to a general framework of government, and limited to a consideration of fundamental principles.' These fundamental matters generally include the protection of basic rights, an
enumeration of the powers of government, some provisions on elections and suffrage, and procedures for amendment of the document.'0 Some authorities have concluded that the fundamental law
of a state should also contain provisions on local finance, home
rule, intergovernmental relations, and public education." Beyond
these core areas, the commentators agree only that state constitutions should not get bogged down in excessively detailed provisions
dealing with emerging social or economic problems that are better
handled by the legislature.'"
This ideal form of a state constitution is directly related to the
function that it must perform. A constitution is a "contract by the
people with each other, to form a government and accept its authority, to define its purposes and powers, to blueprint its structure
and procedures."' s A state constitution must establish the organization of its government and delineate the broad parameters of
public governance.'" This organic document is the highest law in
the hierarchy of legal authority and therefore beyond the purview
9. Munro, An Ideal State Constitution, 181 ANNALS 1, 5 (1935). See generally Grad,
The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. Rav. 928 (1968).
10. Grad, supra note 9, at 948-49.
11. Id. These provisions are included in the National Municipal League's Model State
Constitution. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION arts. 7-9, 11 (6th
ed. 1963).
12. See Fellman, What Should A State Constitution Contain? in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
STATE CONSTITUTONAL REmSION 137, 146 (W. Graves ed. 1960); Wheeler, Introduction, in
NATIONAL MuiCnidAL LEAGUE, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTrrITmONAL REVSION, ix, xi (J. Wheeler
ed. 1961). See generally Bebout, Recent Constitution Writing, 35 Tax. L. REV. 1071 (1957);
Grad, The State's Capacity to Respond to Urban Problems: The State Constitution,in THE
STATES AND THE URBAN CRIusEs 27 (A. Campbell ed. 1970); McMurray, Some Tendencies in

ConstitutionMaking, 2 CALIF. L. Rzv. 203 (1914); Swindler, State Constitutionsfor the 20th
Century, 50 NEB. L. REv. 577 (1971).
13. Henkin, ConstitutionalFathers-ConstitutionalSons, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1113, 1120
(1976).
14. Munro, supra note 9, at 4.
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of normal law-making processes. 5 The fact that it is difficult to
change cautions against its use as a code of laws."6

Most modern state constitutions fall short of this ideal.17 With

a few exceptions," the fundamental law in most jurisdictions is too
long, too specific, and too detailed." As a consequence, most state
constitutions are quite inflexible." The primary reason for this infestation of legislative matter is a basic distrust of the legislative
process. 1 By placing a subject in the state constitution, special interest groups can be assured that desired policies will not be
changed by the legislature. 2 Increasingly, the constitution is transformed into an intimidating check on legislative prerogative. As
one early commentator noted, we seem to be saying:
We have found our servants dishonest; we won't discharge them and try
to get honest and competent ones. No, we will continue to employ those
who have been proved to be bad, but we will take good care to tie their
hands securely so that they can neither steal nor work.H
Grad, supranote 9, at 946. See also Note, The Theory of State Constitutions,1966
Rzv. 542, 546.
16. Grad, supra note 12, at 29-30. See also McMurray, supra note 12, at 213-14.
There is on the face of it, no particular objection to such [legislative] matters being
placed in the constitution. The people are only trying to get out of the bog of
legislative inefficiency created by the constitutions and constitutional amendments adopted in the preceding period. But they are using a cumbersome process. The
machinery is quite disproportionate, in many cases, to the result to be accomplished. It
is like using a trip-hammer to crack a nut. And we must not forget that while the
constitutional provisions of these days are, as Mr. Justice Temple said, in effect statutes, they are statutes of a higher and controlling quality. While the people are legislating through the form of constitutional amendments concerning taxation, they may be
affecting action in some remote sphere of legislation. The legislature, it is conceivable,
may be forbidden by some provision in the general taxation amendment from authorizing a municipality of the sixteenth class to buy a fire engine. Greater freedom of legislative action would be secured if such purely statutory matters could be expressed in the
form of what they are in substance, namely, statutes.
17. Fellman, supra note 12, at 139-40.
18. See Bebout, supra note 12, at 1088 (praising the newer constitutions of Puerto
Rico, Alaska and Hawaii).
19. Fellman, supra note 12, at 145. See also Swindler, supra note 12, at 578-79.
20. Munro, supra note 9, at 4.
When details are crowded into a constitution, they shackle the hands of the public
authorities. The more voluminous the constitution, the more quickly it loses touch with
the social and economic needs of a rapidly growing community. The more precise and
elaborate its provisions, the greater are the obstacles to the reform of abuses.
Id. See also Fellman, supra note 12, at 145; Grad, supra note 9, at 958-59.
21. See McMurray, supra note 12, at 210-14; Comment, California's Constitutional
Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. Rxv. 279, 282-83 (1949).
22. Grad, supra note 9, at 946. See also McMurray, supra note 12, at 216 ("Lawyers
and students of governmental forms may lament the fact that our modern constitutions are
huge and undigested codes of statutory law, but practical men will not trust their legislative
efforts to the dangerous sea of constitutional law.").
23. McMurray, supra note 12, at 213.
15.

UTAH L.
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This attitude is reflected in state constitutional limitations on
the power of taxation. The taxing powers of most state legislatures
are severely restricted by linsitations on rates, debts, and expenditures of public monies." Many state constitutions also place important restrictions on the fiscal powers of local governments.s The
lamentable result in many cases is a constitutional strait jacket on

the revenue raising powers of state and local governments. '6 Most
commentators conclude that such limitations hamper efforts by
state legislators to adopt effective and equitable fiscal policies that
are responsive to current revenue needs.Y
One of the most important limitations on the taxing power of
state and local governments is the requirement that property be
taxed uniformly.2s These uniformity provisions were adopted in the
latter half of the nineteenth century to prohibit preferential treatment of the railroads, land development corporations, and other institutions often aided by the legislatures in the course of industrial
development.2' The clauses were, like many of the constitutional

limitations adopted at that time, "designed to make men honest by
statute"" and generally demanded that the burden of taxation be
equitably apportioned." The drafters of these provisions could not
agree on how this ideal might be accomplished, however, and the
24.

See Bebout, supra note 12, at 1084. See also Gelfand, supra note 2. See generally

Kresky, Taxation and Finance, in NATIONAL MUNIcIPAL LEAGUE, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONsTrru-

TIoNAL REvIsoN 136 (J. Wheeler ed. 1961); Landers, Taxation and Finance, in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN STATE CONsTrTIoNAL REVIsION 225 (W. Graves ed. 1960). For discussions of
revenue articles in specific state constitutions, see Anderson, ConstitutionalAspects of Revenue and Taxation in Texas, 35 TEx. L. REv. 1011 (1957); Parker, Tax Problems Presented by
the Tennessee Constitution, 4 VAND. L. Rv. 116 (1950); Young, The Revenue Article of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970-An Analysis and Appraisal, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 312.
25. See Grad, supra note 12, at 50-53.
26. Grad, supra note 9, at 65-66. For example, one commentator notes that
approximately 10% of the California Constitution deals with revenue and taxation. Fellman,
supra note 12, at 143.
27. See Grad, supra note 12, at 36; Kresky, supra note 24, at 137; Landers, supra note
24, at 225. These commentators also note, however, that limitations on fiscal powers in state
constitutions have not diminished state governmental activity. See Kresky, supra note 24, at
137; Landers, supra note 24, at 238.
28. Kresky, supra note 24, at 138-39. For a comprehensive discussion of state constitutional uniformity provisions, see NEWHOUSE, supra note 6. These restrictions are important
because of the degree to which local governments depend on the property tax for revenue.
Grad, supra note 12, at 51. For a perspective on that dependence, see Gloudemans, Almy,
Miller & Denne, Property Tax Limit Legislation: An Evaluation, 14 AssESSOR'S J. 129, 13037 (1979).
29. Matthews, supra note 6, at 44. Additionally, as intangible forms of wealth became
more important, many states attempted to classify property taxes in an attempt to reach
this new wealth. This development prompted fears of discrimination. See Landers, supra
note 24, at 228-29.
30. McMurray, supra note 12, at 207.
31. Matthews, supra note 6, at 51-54.
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resulting clauses vary considerably in both substance and form.3"
The inflexibility of these strict uniformity provisions is revealed in Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County,3" an early Wisconsin decision. The state constitution provided that the rule of
taxation "shall be uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such
property as the Legislature shall prescribe."'" The court was confronted with a local tax scheme limiting the tax rate on agricultural land within city limits to one-half the tax rate on other property in the city. The court began its analysis by noting that states
have plenary powers, including the power of taxation, which may
be exercised at the will of the legislature in the absence of specific
constitutional limitations.3 5 In this instance, however, the hands of
the legislators were tied:
The theory of our government is, that socially and politically all are
equal, and that special or exclusive, social or political privileges...
cannot be granted, and ought not to be enjoyed .... This principle of
justice and equality which requires that each person should contribute
towards the public expenses his proportionate share, according to the
advantages which he receives, lies at the foundation of our political system; and, in our opinion, it was to give to it a greater permanency and
force, and to secure its more rigid observance, that the section above
quoted was introduced into the constitution.3

The court was, indeed, very "rigid" in its "observance" of the uniformity requirement; it held that the provision mandates both
equal valuation and equal rates, and prohibits classification of
property for taxation purposes." The court dismissed the argument
32.

See NEWHOUSE, supra note 6, at 643-88.

33. 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
34. WIS. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (1848).
35. The court displayed an unusual sensitivity to the nonconstitutional limits on legislative discretion:
The power of taxation is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, and is inherent in
and necessary to the existence of every government. In republics it is vested in the
legislature, and in the absence of any constitutional restrictions, may be exercised by
them, both as to objects and modes, to any extent which they may deem proper. It is
then a matter of legislative discretion with which the courts can seldom or never interfere. In such cases the only guaranties against an abuse of this discretion, by harsh or
unjust taxation, consists in the integrity and sense of justice of the legislature, their
"responsibility to the people," and the power of the people, through the frequent recurrence of elections for the choice of new members to correct any evils which may have
crept in.
Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 378, 387 (1859).
36. Id. at 387-88.
37. Id. at 389. The court concluded that a constitutional amendment would be required to authorize differential tax treatment for farmland:
It may be as well claimed by counsel that the legislature acted unwisely or perhaps
unjustly in including within the territorial limits of the city so much farming or agricultural land, but that is not a matter for judicial correction. Neither is it a matter for

them to correct by discrimination in taxation, when the constitution has declared that
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that the command for uniformity is satisfied when there is uniformity within a proper class: "The answer to this argument is,
that it creates different rules of taxation to the number of which
there is no limit, except that fixed by the legislative discretion,
whilst the constitution establishes but one fixed, unbending, uniform rule upon the subject."
In a sole dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Cole argued that
property is different in kind, and must be taxed accordingly."' He
concluded that as long as all property similarly situated is taxed
similarly throughout the entire taxing district, the demands of uniformity have been met." His position was based not on political
philosophy but on judicial realism: "The idea of a revenue law
which is equal in its operation, however beautiful in theory or desirable in practice, never has, and probably never will be
realized."'"
This somewhat cynical observation has been borne out in subsequent Wisconsin case law. Fifty years after the Knowlton decision, in Chicago & Northwest Railway v. State,4" the court lamented over the inability of public officials and lawyers to define
and implement the constitutional mandate:
It seems quite unaccountable, after the lapse of nearly sixty years since
the constitution was framed, and half a century since that feature of the
article in question was first considered by this court, notwithstanding
the seemingly clear decision then made on the point at that time primarily involved, followed soon thereafter by a second decision covering the
precise matter now in hand, that we should find ourselves at this late
day face to face with a controversy as to the precise meaning of the
words of our organic law: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform, and
taxes shall be levied on such property as the legislature shall prescribe."
That language seems plain, this court, as we shall see, early said it was
very plain, and yet it has been treated time and again as ambiguous,
and still seems to be so regarded, notwithstanding all that this court
has in fifty years said on the subject. And so it must be regarded, especially since men of the highest attainments, lawyers, jurists, and
learned laymen, have read different meanings out of it, having regard,
as it has been thought, to the object of state constitutions and the broad
powers possessed by the people, unrestrained by a charter on the subject. No better object-lesson, perhaps, could well be presented to illusthere shall be no discrimination. The remedy lies in a repeal or an amendment of the
charter.
Id.

38. Id. at 390. For more recent decisions relying heavily on the rationale of the Knowlton decision, see State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960); Boyne v.
State ex rel. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964).
39. 9 Wis. at 394 (Cole, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 398.
42. 128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).
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trate the rule that ambiguity requiring judicial construction may as well
arise through the apparent consequences of applying words in their literal sense to the subject with which they deal as from uncertainty of
sense in the words themselves, than by the matter in hand. By such
application, especially in the light of the varying views entertained of
what this court has decided, the words of the constitution speak one
way, seemingly, to some and another way to others. It is to be hoped
that by the treatment of the subject in the three cases now before us all
obscurities may be cleared up. 3

The obscurities remained, however, and the court found itself with
another half-century of litigation on the matter." Recently, in
Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 5 the court reaffirmed the strict
commands of the uniformity clause and struck down a redevelopment law which allowed for differential assessment of land acquired by private corporations for urban renewal projects." The
court concluded that there can be only one constitutional class for
direct taxation of property. 7
This attitude poses a difficult problem for state legislatures,
because they must develop an effective and equitable property taxation system without differentiating between classes of property.
To be sure, this safeguard inhibits preferential treatment of certain
groups of taxpayers. But it also precludes legislation of a special
character designed to promote the general good. For example, the
state legislature could not pass a differential assessment law
designed to encourage participation of private corporations in the
process of urban renewal."8 Nor could it pass a law providing for
differential assessment of farmland to discourage conversion of agricultural resources to more intensive uses. 9 In Professor McMurray's words, 0 the legislature could neither "steal nor work."
By way of contrast, the federal constitution contains no requirement of uniformity relating to property taxation. Here, the
43. Id. at 587-88, 108 N.W. at 561 (opinion per Marshall, J.).
44. See Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 418, 147 N.W.2d 633, 638 (1967)
("In view of the approximately 20 cases on the same subject that have come before the court
since Mr. Justice Marshall wrote, it is apparent that his hopes have not been realized.").
45. 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
46. Id. at 433, 147 N.W.2d at 646. For a discussion of the Wisconsin law, see Note,
supra note 8, at 885.
47. 33 Wis. 2d at 424, 147 N.W.2d at 641. The Wisconsin court later held that agricultural land could not be assessed at a lower percentage of fair market value than residential
property. State ex rel. Boostrom v. Board of Review, 42 Wis. 2d 149, 166 N.W.2d 184 (1969).
48. See Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
49. See Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Pulaski County Bd. of Equalization, 226 Ark.
64, 582 S.W.2d 942 (1979); State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960);
Boyne v. State ex rel. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964); Knowlton v. Board of
Supervisors, 9 Wis. 378 (1859).
50. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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only limitation on state and local taxation resides within the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 The United
States Supreme Court has never interpreted this mandate to forbid
52
reasonable classification of property for the purpose of taxation.
In fact, the Court seems quite sensitive to the fact that legislatures
must impose special burdens or grant special benefits for the general welfare of the state." The Court has worked a compromise between the legislative right to classify and the demand for equality:
it requires merely that those similarly situated be treated in a similar manner." Under this approach, only patently arbitrary classifi51. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 6, at 601-08. See also Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax
Legislation, 24 VA. L. Rav. 229, 388 (1938).
52. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973).
The Equal Protection Clause does not mean that a State may not draw lines that
treat one class of individuals or entities differently from the others. The test is whether
the difference in treatment is an invidious discrimination. Where taxation is concerned
and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have
large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522 (1959); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Alward v. Johnson,
282 U.S. 509 (1931); Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. County of King, 264 U.S. 22
(1923); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918).
53. See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959).
The states have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. When dealing with
their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National
Government or violating the guaranties of the Federal Constitution, the States have the
attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are
subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and
variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State may
impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the
rate of excise upon various products. It is not required to resort to close distinctions or
to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value.
Id. See also Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 368 (1940).
This Court has previously had occasion to advert to the narrow and sometimes cramping provision of these state uniformity clauses, and has left no doubt that their inflexible restrictions upon the taxing powers of the state were not to be insinuated into the
meritorious conception of equality which alone the Equal Protection Clause was
designed to assure.
That the states may classify property for taxation; may set up different modes of
assessment, valuation and collection; may tax some kinds of property at higher rates than
others; and in making all these differentiations may treat railroads and other utilities
with that separateness which their distinctive characteristics and functions in society
make appropriate-these are among the commonplaces of taxation and of constitutional
law.
Id.
54. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALu. L. Rav. 341, 344
(1949).
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cations will be held invalid."
The temptation to interject this analysis into interpretations of
state constitutional uniformity provisions is great. After all, both
the demand for equality and the requirement of uniformity present
paradoxes of a similar nature. Both seem to suggest that the law
itself must be equal; yet neither can require that "things different
in fact be treated in law as though they were the same."56 Under a
doctrine of reasonable classification state courts could allow legislatures enough latitude to draw distinctions between those things
that are dissimilarly situated. 7 If such practical notions of equality
could be read into existing uniformity provisions, then classification of property for purposes of taxation, where reasonable, probably would be upheld.
Although the idea is tempting, the ability of state courts to
fashion the mandate of uniformity into a broad, general objective is
limited by two considerations. First, every state must bear the burden of its past constitutional history.5 In some jurisdictions, previous judicial interpretations of the state's uniformity clause may inhibit a modern state court from adopting a more flexible attitude
toward the constitutional validity of innovative tax legislation."
The Wisconsin experience again is illustrative. In a recent decision,
the state supreme court reaffirmed the vitality of the Knowlton and
Gottlieb opinions and emphasized that the requirements of uniformity in that jurisdiction are much more rigid than the limitations imposed by the equal protection clause.6 Thus, stare decisis
would curtail a Wisconsin court's latitude to adopt the fourteenth
amendment's doctrine of reasonable classification.
A second consideration inheres in the very nature of state constitutions. As mentioned above, states have plenary powers by virtue of their sovereignty which can be limited only by express state
or federal constitutional provisions. 2 Unlike the federal govern55. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1959). For an excellent
summary of these principles and their application, see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONsTrrumONA LAW 361-65 (1978).
56. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 54, at 344.
57. Of course, any property tax classification scheme would have to be reasonable, and
the measure of its reasonableness would be "the degree of its success in treating similarly
those similarly situated." Id.
58. This approach was suggested by Professor Matthews after an exhaustive study of
state uniformity provisions. See Matthews, supra note 6, at 525-26.
59. Grad, supra note 9, at 956.
60. Id. at 956-57.
61. State ex rel. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Lake Dist. Bd. of Review, 82 Wis. 2d 491,
511, 263 N.W.2d 178, 188 (1978).
62. Grad, supra note 12, at 29; see Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis.
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ment, the states do not derive their power from constitutional
grants of authority. 3 The state constitution is a document of limitation: it limits power even when it purports to establish it. 4 As a
consequence, each and every provision in a state constitution must
be interpreted in light of the instrument's function to place restrictions on governmental authority. 5 Thus, because they appear in
state constitutions, uniformity provisions are not amenable to interpretations that undermine their function as a limitation on the
state's plenary power of taxation.
Because of these limitations, state supreme courts were com378, 387 (1859), discussed at note 35 supra and accompanying text. Accord, Turner v. Superior Court, 3 Ariz. App. 414, 417, 415 P.2d 129, 132 (1966); Standlee v. State, 96 Idaho 849,
852, 538 P.2d 778, 781 (1975); Central La. Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
La. 819, 264 So. 2d 905, 908 (1972); Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 188 Neb.
30, 36, 195 N.W.2d 236, 241 (1972); City of Las Vegas v. Ackerman, 85 Nev. 493, 501-02, 457
P.2d 525, 531 (1969); School Dist. No. 12 v. Wasco County, 270 Or. 622, 627, 529 P.2d 386,
388 (1974); Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518, 525, 238 A.2d 758, 762 (1968);
Peoples Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 250 S.C. 187, 190, 156 S.E.2d 769, 771
(1967); Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 223 Tenn. 415, 426, 446 S.W.2d 260, 265-66 (1969);
State v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258, 271 (Tex. 1978); Lewis Trucking Corp.
v. Commonwealth, 207 Vh. 23, 29, 147 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1966); State v. Bailey, 152 W.Va. 53,
56, 159 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1968).
63. Grad, supra note 12, at 29; see Client Follow-up Co. v. Hynes, 75 Ill. 2d 208, 215,
390 N.E.2d 847, 849, 28 Ill. Dec. 488, 490 (1979).
Under traditional constitutional theory, the basic "sovereign" power of the State resides in the legislature. Therefore, there is no need to grant power to the legislature. All
that needs to be done is to pass such limitations as are desired on the legislature's
otherwise unlimited power.
Id. (paraphrasing G. BRADN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSITFUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND
COMPARATVvE ANALYsIs 111 (1969)). Accord, Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 415,
466 P.2d 18, 20 (1970); Jones v. Mears, 256 Ark. 825, 827-28, 510 S.W.2d 857, 859 (1974);
Methodist Hosp. v. Saylor, 5 Cal. 3d 685, 691, 488 P.2d 161, 165, 97 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1971);
People v. Superior Court, 175 Colo, 391, 394, 488 P.2d 66, 67 (1971); State v. Dickinson, 188
So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1966); Idaho Tel. Co. v. Baird, 91 Idaho 425, 428, 423 P.2d 337, 340-41
(1967); National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., Unified School Dist. No. 234, 225 Kan. 607,
609, 592 P.2d 463, 465 (1979); Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. 1975); State ex rel.
Farmer's Elec. Coop. v. Environmental Improvement Auth., 518 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. 1975);
Cottingham v. State Bd. of Exam., 134 Mont. 1, 11, 17, 328 P.2d 907, 912, 915 (1958); Elliott v.
McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 84, 156 S.E.2d 421, 426 (1967); Perry v. Lawrence County Election
Comm'n, 219 Tenn. 548, 551, 411 S.W.2d 538, 539, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 821 (1967); Fain v.
Chapman, 89 Wash. 2d 48, 53, 569 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1977); State v. Brown, 151 W. Va. 887, 893,
157 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1967); Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyo. Community Dev. Auth., 575
P.2d 1100, 1134 (Wyo. 1978).
64. Grad, supra note 12, at 29; see Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 Ill. 2d 402, 422, 372 N.E.2d 74,
83, 14 Ill. Dec. 269, 278 (1977).
Indeed, the inherent power of government to tax is so well established that it would
undoubtedly be held to exist even in the absence of any constitutional provision authorizing it. . . As a result, any attempt to grant a specific taxing power in a state constitution becomes, in effect, a limitation on the inherent power.
Id. (quoting from 6th Ill. Constitutional Convention, Report of the Committee on Revenue
and Finance, 10 (1970)).
65. See Grad, supra note 12.
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pelled to invalidate legislative attempts to classify property for differential taxation." Public interest groups then focused their attention on the state constitutions themselves. In many states with
strict uniformity requirements, the fundamental law was amended
to provide for preferential treatment of agricultural or forest
lands. 6 This trend became so fashionable that some states added
open space amendments to constitutional provisions that did not
require absolute uniformity. In fact, two jurisdictions amended
their constitutions to provide for differential taxation of real property after their respective state courts had validated preferential
taxation schemes for agricultural land.'
The impact of this development on the concept of uniformity
in state constitutions can be demonstrated by updating an earlier
study of these provisions. In 1959, Newhouse concluded that
twenty-two states have uniformity structures interpreted to require
absolute uniformity.70 All but six of these states have since
amended their constitutions to provide for differential assessment
of agricultural, open space, or forest lands.71 Thus, from this group,
strict uniformity requirements unaltered by open space amendments still exist only in Arkansas, 2 Idaho, 7 Indiana, 71 Mississippi, 5
66. See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960); Boyne v.
State ex rel Dickerson, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964).
67. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8; KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 12; ME. CoNST. art. 9, §
8; NEB. CONST. art. 8, § 1; NEv. CONST. art. 10, § 1; OHIo CONST. art. 2, § 36; TENN. CONST.
art. 2, § 28; TEx. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1-d, 1-d-1; Wis. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
68. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 8, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 172A; VA. CONST. art. 10, § 2.
69. See PENN. CONST. art. 8, § 2(b)(i) (adopted after Bensalem Township School Dist.
v. County Comm'rs, 8 Pa. Commonw. Ct. 411, 303 A.2d 258 (1973) (upholding preferential
assessment of land restricted by covenant to remain in open space use for five years)); FA.
CONST. art. 7, § 4(a) (following Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965) (upholding
legislative definition of "just valuation" of agricultural land to include its value for that use

only)).
70. NEWHOUSE, supra note 6, at 665. The states are: Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
71. See ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 217; CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4(a);
ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 4(b); KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 12; ME. CONST. art. 9, § 8; MASS. CONST.
Articles of Amendment, art. 41; Nan. CONST. art. 8, § 1; NaV. CONST. art. 10, § 1; N.H.
CONST. art. 5b; OHIo CONST. art. 2, § 36; TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 28; Mx. CoNsT. art. 8, §§ 1-

d, 1-d-1; UTAH CONST. art. 13, § 3; W. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 53; WIS. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
72. Arkansas provides for property to be taxed according to value determined equally
and uniformly throughout the state. ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 5. In addition, the constitution
states: "No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher
than another species of property of equal value. . . ." Id. In a recent decision, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that legislation authorizing use-value assessments for
agricultural and timber lands violated these uniformity provisions. Arkansas Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Pulaski County Bd. of Equalization, 266 Ark. 64, 582 S.W.2d 942 (1979). The
court emphasized the fact that the state uniformity clause explicitly precludes classification
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South Carolina,7" and Wyoming.7
The open space amendments vary in form almost as much as
do their parent uniformity provisions. A significant number of the
7
amendments authorize use-value assessment for open space areas. 1
A few jurisdictions set up elaborate classification schemes, assigning different rates of taxation for certain classes of real property. 7' Other states simply grant certain landowners partial relief
from property taxation 0 The Kansas Constitution authorizes assessment of agricultural land on the basis of its productivity;" the
Texas Constitution mandates such procedures. 2 In California, open
of property for taxing purposes, and ordered compliance with the constitutional mandate. Id.
at -, 582 S.W.2d at 949-50. The decision immediately prompted proposals to reform the
uniformity requirement. See PROPOSED ARKANSAS CoNsTrrUTON OF 1980, TENTATIVE DRAFT
art. 7, § 5 and Schedule II, § 2 (July 1979); S.J. Res. 1, Extended Session of the Arkansas
General Assembly (January 1980). Arkansas voters will decide at the November 1980 general
election whether to adopt any constitutional changes relating to the requirement of uniform
taxation.
73. Although one provision in the Idaho Constitution requires only that taxes shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of a taxing jurisdiction,
another provision requires that the legislature provide such revenue as may be needed so
that every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property. IDAHO
CONST. art. 7, §§ 2, 5. The state supreme court has intdrpreted this uniformity structure to
prohibit classification of property for real estate tax purposes. See Idaho Tel. Co. v. Baird,
91 Idaho 425, 429, 423 P.2d 337, 341 (1967).
A constitutional rule of uniform ad valorem taxation forbids legislative classifications of property for the purpose of imposing a greater burden of ad valorem taxation on
one class than on another; that is, all property not exempt from taxation must be assessed at a uniform percentage of actual cash value, and a single fixed rate of taxation
must apply against all taxable property.
Id. Accord, Merris v. Ada County, 100 Idaho 59, 593 P.2d 394, 401 (1979). See generally
NEWHOUSE, supra note 6, at 381-87.
74. Indiana provides for a uniform and equal rate of taxation. IND. COST. art. 10, § 1.
For a discussion of Indiana decisions interpreting the state's uniformity clause, see Myers,
supra note 5-12.
75. Mississippi provides that taxation shall be uniform and proportionate to value.
Miss. CoNsT. art. 4, § 112. See generally Robertson, Problems of Valuation and Equalization
in Mississippi'sAd Valorem Tax System, 48 Miss. L.J. 201, 230-35 (1977).
76. South Carolina provides for uniform taxation with certain exceptions not including
agricultural, forest, or open space land. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
77. Wyoming provides for just valuation of property with uniform taxation. Wyo.
CONST. art. 1, § 28; art. 15, § 11.
78. For these amendments, with the dates of adoption indicated in parentheses, see,
e.g., DEL. CoNST. art 8, § 1 (1977); FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4(a) (1968); Ky. CONST. § 172A
(1969); MD. CONST. art. 43 (1960); MASS. CONST. amend, art. 41, art. 112 (1978); Ma. CONST.
art. 9 § 8 (1970); NEB. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (1978); N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1,
lb (1963); OHio
CONST. art. 2, § 36 (1974); UTAH CONST. art. 13, § 3 (1969); WASH. CONST. art. 7, § 11 (1968).
79. See, e.g., ALA. CoNST. art. XI, § 217 (1972); TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 28 (1973).
80. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 7 (1976); Nav. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (1974); VA.
CONST. art. 10, § 2 (1971); W. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 53 (1946); Wis. CoNST. art. 8, § 1 (1974).
81. KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 12 (1976).
82. TaX. CONST. art. 8, § 1-d-1 (1978).
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space land can be valued for property tax purposes on a basis that
is consistent with its enforceably restricted use, 3 while in
Oklahoma, the legislature has been directed to assess all real estate
on the basis of its "highest and best" use value for the previous
year. 4
Before establishing criteria for evaluating the content of these
open space amendments, we must regain our focus on the proper
function of state constitutions. To the extent that a state's fundamental law should be brief, general, and devoid of unnecessary restrictions on governmental activity, amendments to the document
must face particular scrutiny. 5 They should be used to eliminate
excessive detail and to make the original constitution more concise.8 State supreme court decisions can help determine whether
these open space provisions tend to reduce the constitutional instability fostered by strict uniformity clauses, or rather serve as independent causes of inflexibility in state constitutional law. Moreover, these opinions can be useful in developing guidelines for
articulating the appropriate content of constitutional limitations on
state governmental powers of taxation.
II.

EVALUATING THE CONTENT OF OPEN SPACE AMENDMENTS

The desirability of adopting a particular constitutional amendment must be judged against standards reflecting an appreciation
of the role of state constitutions. Professor Grad proposes a balancing test: he asserts that each proposal must be evaluated to determine "whether the value of embodying this proposal in higher law,
beyond change by normal lawmaking processes, is greater than the
cost of so doing."" This process begins by asking whether the subject matter of the provision is sufficiently important to be given its
enduring and controlling position in a constitution. 8 This consideration must then be weighed against the purported costs of constituCAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8 (1976).
OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 8 (1972).
85. See generally Grad, Some Implications of State Constitutional Amendment for the
Draftsman, in The Drafting of State Constitutions: Working Papers for a Manual (Mimeograph, National Municipal League 1967).
86. Id. at 4. Occasionally, the amendment process may be used to accommodate evolving values of a fundamental nature, such as the environmental rights provisions recently
adopted in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7 (1968); ILL. CONsT. art. 11,
§ 1-2 (1971); MmiH. CONST. art. 4, § 52 (1964); N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 4 (1970); PA. CONST.
art. 1, § 28 (1971); R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (1970); VA. CONST. art. 11, §§ 1-2 (1971). For an
excellent discussion of these provisions, see Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193 (1972).
87. Grad, supra note 9, at 972.
88. Id. at 950.
83.

84.
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tional regulation of a subject: inflexibility, obsolescence, constitutional instability, and nullification of inconsistent government
action." When these adverse consequences are warranted by the
positive aspects of a constitutional proposal, then an amendment
can be justified.' 0
Under this analysis, the first requirement for justification of
certain subject matter in the form of an amendment to a state constitution is that the proposal be important enough to warrant constitutional status." The few open space amendments that contain a
statement of purpose indicate that they are designed to accommodate the need for tax legislation promoting the preservation of open
space areas.'" Admittedly, most commentators remain quite skeptical about the efficacy of differential taxation for preserving open
space land.' 3 Nevertheless, an overwhelming number of jurisdictions have adopted preferential taxation programs for these areas."
While strong public sentiment should by no means be the conclusive factor in determining whether a provision merits constitutional
consideration, popular pressure should be given serious attention if
the interests promoted are sufficiently broad and permanent. 5
The strong public support for open space taxation schemes
may indicate that considerations other than natural resource preservation are being promoted by these statutes. In the case of agricultural land, for example, differential taxation programs may be
supported simply because they provide tax relief for farmers." This
possibility is suggested in an early Iowa decision where the state
supreme court upheld an agricultural property tax credit statute on
the basis that inherent differences in the nature of property will
support a classification scheme for tax purposes. 7 The court held
89.

Id. at 972.

90. Id. at 959-60.
91. Id. at 950.
92. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8; TEx. CONST. art. 8, § 1-d-1.
93. See generally Currier, supra note 5.
94. See note 5, supra.
95. Grad, supra note 9, at 950. Professor Grad adds this important caveat:
It must be said, however, that more is necessary to warrant inclusion than a mere demonstration of pressures, and that the satisfaction of some other value ought to be required to convince the constitution-maker that the particular proposal which has a popular demand behind it is of sufficiently enduring and important character to argue for
its inclusion in the state constitution. The problem here is likely to be greater in the
case of special privileges protected in existing constitutions, for special interest groups
are not likely to surrender constitutionally protected advantages without a fight.
Id. at 950-51.
96. See Currier, supra note 5, at 840; Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property
Taxation-Some Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 628, 652.
97. Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 35 N.W.2d 66 (1948).
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that the legislature "could reasonably have concluded that agricultural lands are taxed excessively for school purposes as compared
with property devoted to other uses and that such taxes should be
equalized in accordance with benefits received.""8 The court also
approved the power of state legislatures to calibrate their tax laws
in order to encourage an industry deemed vital to the welfare of the
state.99 The court said in effect that what is good for agriculture is
good for the state as a whole."' A similar philosophy has been expressed by Connecticut courts in dismissing challenges to differential taxation programs for forest lands and open space in that
state.1"' Thus, certain ecological or historical factors may legitimately weigh heavily in support of constitutional status for provisions closely tied to local matters of important economical
98. Id. at 402, 35 N.W.2d at 73. Accord, Great N. Ry. v. Whitfield, 65 S.D. 173, 272
N.W. 787 (1937).
99. 240 Iowa at 408, 35 N.W.2d at 76.
The power of state legislatures to adjust their tax laws in order to encourage an
industry or undertaking deemed vital to the welfare of the state or in furtherance of
some related principle of public policy has frequently been upheld.
The governor of the state in commenting upon the report of the school code commission said in his message to the legislature that enacted this law, "We all know that
agriculture is Iowa's basic resource. Upon its prosperity depends the prosperity of our
great number of small businesses and communities." It was most effectively demonstrated during the depression of the early nineteen thirties that the well-being of the
state as a whole is directly dependent upon the welfare of agriculture. The prosperity of
our basic industry was no less vital when this act was passed nor is it less vital now
when many other countries look to us for food and agriculture must supply their needs.
Id.
100. Id. at 409, 35 N.W.2d at 76.
101. See Baker v. Town of West Hartford, 89 Conn. 394, 398-99, 94 A. 283, 284-85
(1915).
The purpose of this legislation was to induce owners of land to plant their property with
forest trees. As a reward for such action the property owner was to have his property so
planted exempt from taxation. . . .The obvious purpose of the Act of 1911 is one in
which every citizen of this State has an interest. Our woodlands protect sources of rivers and lesser streams. Upon our forests largely rests the beauty of our New England
scenery. The lumbering industry of this State is one of vast importance to a locality
whose forests have been rapidly disappearing. The power sought to be used in this case
has long been exercised in Connecticut, and has remained unchallenged until the present controversy. In deciding whether in a given case, the object for which taxes are
assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line of public use, courts must be
governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes
have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, and what objects or
purposes have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the
government, whether State or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to this and is
sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people may well be held to belong to
the public use, and to be proper for the maintenance of good government, though this
may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation.
Id. See also Curry v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 34 Conn. Supp. 52, 376 A.2d 79 (1977)
(upholding a statute providing for a ten-year decrease in the conveyance tax imposed on
sales of property classified as open space land).
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significance.' °2
The most compelling reason for including open space taxation
amendments in state constitutions, however, is the lack of any alternative means for validating differential taxation programs." 3 In
many jurisdictions, a rigid uniformity structure precluded adoption
of preferential taxation for open space land. For example, early
farmland preservation acts were invalidated by state courts in
Maryland, ' Nevada, ' New Jersey, ' and Ohio. 07 The prohibition
on classification of property for tax purposes in these jurisdictions
prevented state courts from following the example of federal constitutional doctrine favoring legislative discretion.' Actually, the
courts had very little choice; the power to classify property for taxation had been circumscribed by earlier generations of constitution
writers distrustful of the broad powers vested in state legislatures. ' That power can only be restored to the legislatures by special clauses in state constitutions. In this manner, the courts became the principal catalyst to the adoption of open space taxation
0
amendments in modern constitutions."
The narrow construction of uniformity structures in state
courts even tended to inhibit federal courts from upholding classification schemes for taxing real property. State judicial interpretations of constitutional tax limitations are binding on federal courts
construing uniformity provisions in state constitutions."' If a state
court does not countenance a classification system of taxation, then
federal courts are at a loss to find the requisite rational basis for its
102. Grad, supra note 9, at 952-53. This fact may explain why some jurisdictions
added open space amendments to constitutional provisions that do not require absolute uniformity. See notes 68-69, supra. Significantly, neither Iowa nor Connecticut have adopted
open space taxation provisions; in both jurisdictions, the state constitution is silent as to the
requirement of uniformity in property taxation.
103. See generally Grad, supra note 9, at 954-55.
104. State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960).
105. Boyne v. State ex rel. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964).
106. Switz v. Kingsley, 69 N.J. Super. 27, 173 A.2d 449 (1961).
107. State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195
N.E.2d 908 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1964).
108. See notes 51-65 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
110. In some jurisdictions, the mere apprehension of invalidation by a state supreme
court prompted an amendment to the constitutional requirement of uniformity. See Kelsey
v. Colwell, 30 Cal. App. 3d 590, 595, 106 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (1973). In Kansas, the state
constitution was amended to provide for open space taxation after an opinion by the Kansas
attorney general indicated that the differential assessment law would not pass constitutional
muster. See Nelson, Differential Assessment of Agricultural Land in Kansas: A Discussion
and Proposal,25 KAN. L. REv. 215, 218 (1977).
111. Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615, 622 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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for example, a federal court

struck down a statewide property tax system permitting different
assessment ratios for different counties. Alabama courts had
strictly interpreted the state uniformity clause"' to prohibit classification. The variations between counties conflicted with this mandate. Consequently, no rational basis could be found to sustain the
discrimination and the court ordered the state to equalize assessments between counties.1 5 One year later, the Alabama uniformity
provision was replaced by a detailed classification scheme for the
taxation of real property. 6
A recent Illinois decision does suggest that courts in some jurisdictions may counteract the amendment breeding effect of past
interpretations of the uniformity concept. In Hoffmann v. Clark,"7
landowners challenged a new statewide use-value assessment law
112. Id. at 623. See also Louisville & N. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 249 F. Supp.
894 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd 389 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1968). Where the state sanctions a de
facto system of classification for property tax purposes, however, a strict uniformity provision may not be binding on federal courts. See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310
U.S. 362 (1940).
Since, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, a state can put railroad property
into one pigeonhole and other property into another, the only question relevant for us is
whether the state has done so. If the discrimination of which the Railway complains
had been formally written into the statutes of Tennessee, challenge to its constitutionality would be frivolous. If the state supreme court had construed the requirement of
uniformity in the Tennessee Constitution so as to permit recognition of these diversities, no appeal could successfully be made to the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, according to petitioner's own claim, all the organs of the state are conforming to a practice, systematic, unbroken for more than forty years, and now questioned for the first
time. It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of "laws"
to what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon it. Settled state practice cannot supplant constitutional guarantees, but it
can establish what is state law. The Equal Protection Clause did not write an empty
formalism into the Constitution. Deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out
state policy, such as those of which petitioner complains, are often tougher and truer
law than the dead words of the written text. . . . And if the state supreme court
chooses to cover up under a formal veneer of uniformity the established system of differentiation between two classes of property, an exposure of the fiction is not enough to
establish its unconstitutionality. Fictions have played an important and sometimes
fruitful part in the development of law; and the Equal Protection Clause is not a command of candor.
Id. at 369. (Frankfurter, J., opinion for the Court).
113. 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
114. ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 211 (1901)(providing in part, "All taxes levied on property
in this state shall be assessed in exact proportion to the value of such property. .. ").
115. Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615, 625 (M.D. Ala. 1971). For an excellent
discussion of the Weissinger case, see Yudof, The Property Tax in Texas Under State and
Federal Law, 51 Tax. L. REv. 885, 915-18 (1973).
116. ALA. CoNsT. amend. 325 (1972, amended 1978).
2d 402, 372 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
117. 69 Ill.
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for open space land.118 The uniformity clause confronting the court
appeared to prohibit classification of property in counties with
populations under 200,000 people.' By looking to convention debates, however, the court inferred that "the uniformity limitation
meant only that taxes must be equal and uniform among the members of the same class" in all taxing jurisdictions.' 2 ' The court then
adopted a relatively broad judicial definition of legislative authority concerning matters of taxation:
We are not, therefore, through judicial interpretation, disposed to fulfill
the fears expressed in the report of the Committee on Revenue and Finance by placing upon the constitutional provision here under consideration a "narrow" or "unintended" limitation upon the General Assembly. We are at this period of time early in the life of this constitution.
We should not now through narrow construction make it difficult or impossible for the legislative body at some future time to resolve revenue
problems which are not now known or foreseeable. We acknowledge that
classification of real property was severely criticized by some during the
convention and that the convention had before it reports from other
States where classification had been practiced, which warned of its
abuse. We cannot read into the Constitution a limitation which it does
not contain solely to prevent some possible future abuse. Whether the
principle of classification may at some time in the future be unwisely
applied is not of judicial concern. The formation of tax policy, although
it may be foolish and unwise, as long as it remains within constitutional
limits, is peculiarly within the province of the elected representatives of
the People.'

This attitude represents a significant departure from traditional
notions about the constitutional mandate of uniformity. 2 2 If it does
118. Revenue Act of 1939, §§ 20a-1 to 20a-3, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501a-1 to 501a3 (1977).
119. Im. CoNST. art. 9, § 4 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property shall be
levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by
law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter prescribe by
law, counties with a population of more than 200,000 may classify or to [sic] continue to
classify real property for purposes of taxation. Any such classification shall be reasonable and assessments shall be uniform within each class. The level of assessment or rate
of tax of the highest class in a county shall not exceed two and one-half times the level
of assessment or rate of tax of the lowest class in that county. Real property used in
farming in a county shall not be assessed at a higher level of assessment than single
family residential real property in that county.
120. 69 Ill. 2d at 419, 372 N.E.2d at 82.
121. Id. at 424, 372 N.E.2d at 84-85. For an analysis of the Hoffmann decision in the
context of differential taxation schemes to preserve agricultural land, see Myers, supra note
5, at 15-18.
122. The Hoffmann decision apparently surprised a number of people, including the
Illinois General Assembly. See Turano, The Conference Committee Report-A Potentially
Dangerous Tool, 68 ILL. B.J. 26 (1979).
The General Assembly, expecting a contrary holding, hurriedly passed another Act in
1977-while the Hoffman [sic] appeal was pending-making provision for farmlands to
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in fact signal a trend toward vesting a greater amount of discretion
in the legislature for tax matters, 23 then the need for amending existing uniformity provisions in some state constitutions may be
diminishing.
Thus far, this Article has been concerned with the various justifications for putting open space taxation provisions in state constitutions. It should be noted, however, that these amendments can
have important negative effects on state constitutional law. Because every provision in a state constitution acts as a limitation on
the plenary power to govern, the infestation of legislative matter
changes the character of the document from organic law to "more
of a geologic accretion of protections against the fears of the
past."' 24 As each additional layer becomes more elaborate, costly
court decisions may be needed to interpret the meaning of these
constitutional regulations.125 Professor Munro stated it succinctly:
"Litigation thrives on constitutional verbosity."' 2
In addition, if the open space amendments are narrowly
drawn, they can become an independent cause of excessively frequent amendments, adding to the atmosphere of constitutional instability.2 7 Any detailed constitutional provision can stimulate
be assessed for tax purposes by a new "alternative" method of assessment, which
method permits no roll-back or recapture of taxes for prior years in the event of a
change in the agricultural use of the property.
Id. at 26 (footnotes omitted). As a consequence of these developments, Illinois currently has
two farmland preferential assessment statutes. See ILL. Iav. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501a-1 to
501a-3, 50le (1977).
123. See Swindler, supra note 12, at 595.
An encouraging trend appears to have developed in quite recent years, as state
legislatures have been urged to act more boldly under existing constitutional power,
and courts in a number of states have sustained their actions. Where the constitutional
language is not in itself restrictive, the general policy endorsed by the constitutional
language need not be subjected to rules of strict construction. And where historically a
word or phrase has taken on a new meaning or understanding now in general acceptance, which differs from the meaning of the time of enactment of the constitutional
passage in which the word or phrase appears, the recent usage will apply. The selfexecuting nature of many constitutional provisions has been reaffirmed, and in matters
of constitutional questions the issue of standing has been disposed of in a manner more
conformable with recent federal decisions. The matter of the wisdom of legislation is
once again being left to the legislature, and any changing view of public policy relating
to legislative enactments is apt to be accepted by the courts.
Id.
124. Grad, supra note 9, at 30.
125. In Florida, for example, the state supreme court has issued three decisions in the
last four years requiring an interpretation of the agricultural use value assessment provision
in the state constitution. See Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1979);
Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977); Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc.,
326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
126. Munro, supra note 9, at 4.
127. See generally Grad, supra note 9, at 959.
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subsequent amendments simply to keep the minutiae of regulations current with contemporary needs."' In Texas, for example, a
statute-like open space provision has been followed by a more recent amendment mandating taxation of agricultural land on the
basis of its productive capacity. 2' These provisions have been followed in turn by a clause explaining how the other two directives
can be read together. 3 ' Clearly, any. desires by the Texas legislature to deviate from this detailed constitutional norm will have to
be satisfied by further amendment to the fundamental law. 3'
Open space amendments also aggravate the problem of constitutional instability by creating negative implications which further
restrict the scope of rigid uniformity provisions. 3 ' Professor Grad
explains:
Whenever a narrowly limiting provision is amended by adding an exception to the limitation, the general scope of the provision is likely to
become even more narrowly limited in that the stated exception may be
taken by implication to disallow other exceptions not expressly stated.
Every detailed constitution thus develops certain sore points which become the foci for veritable clusters of constitutional amendments. One
critic has aptly characterized such provisions as "constitutional amendment breeders."13

Strict uniformity clauses epitomize the amendment breeding provisions in state constitutions. Their demand for absolute equality
forces legislators seeking to use the taxing power for some perceived
social good to promote a constitutional amendment that will allow
for differential treatment of certain groups of taxpayers. Seldom is
the result a clause that simply enables the legislature to classify
property for taxing purposes. 34 The process is a political one; the
narrower the scope of the amendment, the greater the likelihood it
128. Id. at 969.
129. Tax. CONST. art. 8,§§ 1-d, 1-d-1.
130. Tx. CoNSr. art. 8, § 1-d-l(b).
131. The recently amended Alabama uniformity clause, which contains thirteen
paragraphs of an elaborate scheme to classify property for taxing purposes, is another good
example of the kind of detail that fosters constitutional instability. See AlA. CoNsT. amend.
373.
132. Grad, supra note 85, at 16.
133. Grad, supra note 9, at 969-70 (footnotes omitted).
134. See Grad, supra note 85, at 5.
Most amendments are initiated by groups, either private or public, who seek constitu-

tional change to remedy a situation which adversely affects them. Such a group will

usually suggest an amendment, which although solving its immediate problem, ignores
the broader aspects of the same situation leaving no further detailed amendment matters which could have been resolved with a single more general one, and leaving unresolved the problem of an overly detailed constitution (footnotes omitted).
Id. For a flavor of the politics involved in the passage of an open space amendment, see
Comment, Property Taxes and Farmers in Ohio: The Park Investment Story, 7 U. TOL. L.
REv. 1125, 1180-94 (1976).
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will escape controversy.135 Yet the courts are apt to imply from this
narrow exception that other deviations not specifically enumerated
in the constitution cannot be allowed. 13 As other groups seek preferential treatment, the cycle begins again and a new amendment is
3
promoted while the parent uniformity clause remains unchanged.
The experience in Missouri reveals both the uncertainty and
the inflexibility that can result from excessive constitutional regulation of state and local taxing powers. One provision in the state
constitution dictates that taxes must be uniform upon the same
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the taxing authority.1 31 Other provisions classify taxable property:
Section 4(a).
follows: class
3, intangible
may provide
solely on the

All taxable property shall be classified for tax purposes as
1, real property; class 2, tangible personal property; class
personal property. The general assembly, by general law,
for further classification within classes 2 and 3, based
nature and characteristics of the property ...

Section 4(b). Property in classes 1 and 2 and subclasses of class 2, shall
be assessed for tax purposes at its value or such percentage of its value
as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass of class
139
2 .

These provisions clearly imply that property in class 1-real property-cannot be classified for differential taxation purposes. 4 ' Ap135. Grad, supra note 85, at 5.
136. See, e.g., City of E. Orange v. Township of Livingston, 102 N.J. Super. 512, 246
A.2d 178 (1968).
It is clear that the people in adopting S.C.R. 16 as an amendment to the Constitution,
and the Legislature by its enactment of the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964, did not
intend to treat in any way or to confer any special, different, or new tax status upon
municipally-owned watersheds. Such a result is not warranted by implication.
Id. at 535, 246 A.2d at 190 (footnotes omitted). See generally Grad, supra note 12, at 29.
137. The resulting pattern of frequent constitutional amendment had led some authorities to become quite pessimistic about the probability of reversing this cycle. See Grad,
supra note 9, at 969. Recent developments nevertheless provide some grounds for optimism.
For many years, the Louisiana Constitution had the dubious distinction of being the longest
on record. See Owen, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana, 8 LA. L. REv. 1
(1947). In 1974, however, a state constitutional convention undertook the task of streamlining the fundamental law of the state, which had grown with its 536 amendments to attain a
length of about 255,500 words. The new constitution contains about 35,000 words. Although
the document still contains matter which might otherwise be left to the legislature, about
158,600 words from the old document were shifted into the statute books. See Morgan, A
New Constitutionfor Louisiana, 63 NAT'L Civic Rxv. 343, 344 (1974).
138. Mo. CONsr. art. 10, § 3.
139. Mo. CONST. art. 10, §§ 4(a)-(b).
140. See Drey v. State Tax Comm'n, 345 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1961).
We recognize that inequalities in assessment are inevitable; that perfect equality in
assessment and exactitude in the distribution of the tax burden upon the owners of
different types and kinds of real estate is not humanly possible. Like classification of
real property and uniform taxes upon the same class of subjects, however, are not only
possible but are required, by Constitution of Missouri, 1945, Art. X, §§ 4(a) and 3,
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parently sensitive to this issue, the Missouri legislature initiated
the passage of a constitutional amendment that would authorize
preferential tax treatment of both forest lands and blighted areas.' 4 ' More recently, the legislature made a similar but unsuccessful attempt to add another amendment authorizing differential
taxation for agricultural land.' The specific grant of authority to
tax forest lands preferentially may lead Missouri courts to conclude
that the exercise of other powers not specifically enumerated must
be circumscribed.' Thus, by negative implication, the state's recently enacted Agricultural Valuation and Assessment Act'" could
be overturned by the courts.'"
respectively. There are no subclassifications of real estate for the purposes of taxation.
It seems hardly necessary to add that all wild timberlands must be assessed on
an equal and comparable basis with all lands in the county whether rural or urban,
farm land or timberland, improved or unimproved; that town lots, farm lands and wild
timberlands may not be classified separately and assessed at different rates (less than
30%, 30%, and 30 to 100%, respectively), and that the constitutional requirements are
not met by the assessment of all wild timberlands in the county on an equal, comparable and reasonably uniform basis while intentionally, designedly and systematically applying different rates to other entire classes of real property.
Id. at 236-37. But see State ex rel. Howard Elec. Coop. v. Riney, 490 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Mo. 1973)
(a difference in methods of assessment does not produce subclassification of property in violation of § 4(a) of art. 10). A similar problem exists in Michigan, where the state uniformity
clause provides in part, "Every tax other than the general ad valorem property tax shall be
uniform upon the class or classes on which it operates." MICH. CONsT. art. 9, § 3. This
phrase may imply that classification of open space land for differential taxation purposes is
prohibited. See Nord, The Michigan Constitutionof 1963, 10 WAYNE L. RIv. 309, 357 (1964).
See also Stanley & Tunstall, State and Local Taxation, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 643, 691 (1973)
(urging greater equalization between types of property to avoid the de facto classification of
farmland and residential property as one class and industrial and commercial property as
another).
141. Mo. CoNsT. art. 10, § 7.
142. See Lapping, Bevins & Herbers, Differential Assessment and Other Techniques to
Preserve Missouri's Farmlands,42 Mo. L. Rav. 369, 380-81 (1977).
143. See Grad, supra note 12, at 29.
One consequence of state constitutions as documents of limitation is 'that they limit
powers even when they purport to grant them, for the express grant of powers in a
document of limitation is usually interpreted to mean that the power must be exercised
in the precise way in which it has been granted. It may mean, by negative implication,
moreover, that the specific powers granted by enumeration are all of the powers that
may be exercised, because the enumeration of some may be taken to prohibit the exercise of those not enumerated. Since the state has plenary powers without the constitutional grant, one way to give meaning to a purported grant is to draw a negative implication as to powers not included.
Id.
144. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 137.017-.026 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
145. Accord, Lapping, Bevins & Herbers, supra note 141, at 380-81. The authors advocate passage of a constitutional amendment to authorize differential taxation of farmland.
This approach was taken by the drafters of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution when they
wanted to provide for differential taxation of open space land and historic landmarks under
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In short, open space amendments actually contribute to the
inflexibility of existing uniformity provisions in many state constitutions. These strict uniformity clauses, like all provisions in a
state constitution, must be interpreted in light of the fact that they
are express limitations on the otherwise plenary powers of state
governments. The repeated attempts to restore some of this power
by piecemeal amendments indicate that these rigid limitations no
longer reflect contemporary notions about the need for precise
equality in property taxation."' Yet the passage of these amendments creates negative implications that jeopardize differential tax
legislation unaccompanied by a similar constitutional underpinning. In Missouri, for example, the legislature can use differential
taxation to encourage urban renewal while the use of a similar
technique to discourage conversion of agricultural land to nonfarm
uses is of doubtful constitutional validity.'47 In Wisconsin, the reverse is true; that state's legislature can adopt preferential taxation
laws for preserving farmland, but not to promote the use of private
capital for urban redevelopment.14 8 In both jurisdictions, the presence of specifically enumerated exceptions to the general rule of
uniformity makes it all the more difficult for legislatures to respond
to pressures for new and different programs involving the taxation
of real property.' 4 '
Occasionally, a state court will interpret its constitution to validate a new differential taxation program despite the presence of a
strict uniformity provision.' In Frazer v. Carr,'5 for example, the
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the consolidation of Davidson
County and the City of Nashville against allegations that the taxing provisions of the new metropolitan government violated the
state uniformity clause. 52 These provisions established two service
a uniformity structure substantially similar to the one in Missouri. See LA. CoNST. art. 7, §
18. The constitution of the state of Washington follows a similar pattern. See WAsH. CoNsr.
art. 7, §§ 1, 11.
146. See Grad, supra note 85, at 16.
147. See notes 138-144 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text; Wis. CoNST. art. 8, § 1.
149. For examples of the kinds of programs that may require constitutional amendments under existing uniformity structures in several jurisdictions, see Minan & Lawrence,
State Tax Incentives to Promote the Use of Solar Energy, 56 Tax. L. Ra,. 835 (1978); Shull,
The Use of Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation,8 CONN. L. Rav. 334 (1976).
150. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 Ill.2d 402, 372 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
151. 210 Tenn. 565, 360 S.W.2d 449 (1962).
152. TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 28 (1870, amended 1973), providing in part:
All property shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such
manner as the Legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform
throughout the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected,
shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the same value. ...
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districts with different rates of taxation corresponding to the level
of services provided to taxpayers in both urban and rural areas of
the county.15 The court never really addressed the question
whether this differential taxation scheme violated Tennessee law,'5'
but focused instead on the constitutional amendment authorizing
city-county consolidations' and on the "practical nature" of state
constitutions. ' " The court quoted the following passage from a previous decision:
'Constitutions,' said Mr. Story, 'are instruments of a practical nature,
founded on the common business of life, adapted to common wants,
designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The
people make them, the people adopt them, they must be supposed to
read them with the help of common sense ....

They must be inter-

preted in the light of practical sense and enforced according to their
manifest intention.' (Emphasis added)'"

With these rules of construction in mind, the court concluded that
taxpayers in rural Davidson County would never have approved an
enabling amendment that would impose a tax upon them for services they would never receive.' 8 Moreover, the court reasoned, the
drafters of this enabling amendment would never have wasted their
time designing a provision that would so surely meet defeat." 9 The
This provision was changed substantially in 1973 to allow for a classified property tax system. TENN. CoNST. art. 2, § 28. The constitutionality of the amendment was upheld in Snow
v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
153. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3711 (Supp. 1979). See also Wthite, Differential Property
Taxation in Consolidated City-Counties, 63 NAT'L CIwc REv. 301 (1974). See generally
Grubbs, Legal Aspects of City-County Consolidation in Tennessee, 30 TNN. L. Rlv. 499
(1963); Mendelson, Consolidationof County and City Functions and Other Devices for Simplifying Tennessee Local Government, 8 VAND. L. Rav. 878 (1955).
154. In dicta, however, the court quoted with approval the following conclusion from
the lower court's opinion:
'To argue that the farmer in the outlying area of Davidson County, without benefit of
urban services, must be taxed at the same rate as the property owner residing within
the Urban Services District, with benefit of urban services, actually ignores the principle of equal and uniform taxation. .. .'
210 Tenn. at 578-79, 360 S.W.2d at 454-55.
155. TaNN. CoNsT. art. 11, § 9.
The General Assembly may provide for the consolidation of any or all of the gov-

ernmental and corporate functions now or hereafter vested in municipal corporations
with the governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter vested in the counties
in which such municipal corporations are located; provided, such consolidations shall
not become effective until submitted to the qualified voters residing within the munici-

pal corporation and in the county outside thereof, and approved by a majority of those
voting within the municipal corporation and by a majority of those voting in the county
outside the municipal corporation.

Id.
156. 210 Tenn. at 579-82, 360 S.W.2d at 455-56.
157. Id. at 579, 360 S.W.2d at 455.

158. Id. at 580, 360 S.W.2d at 455.
159. Id., 360 S.W.2d at 455.
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court held that the enabling amendment authorized the differential
tax rate between urban and rural areas in the new taxing district.'60
In most instances, however, state courts will be inhibited from
adopting such flexible interpretations of legislative authority under
strict uniformity structures. Unlike the Illinois court in Hoffmann
or the Tennessee court in Frazer, courts in some jurisdictions will
find it difficult to avoid giving effect to the literal demands of rigid
uniformity provisions.'"' As a result, state governments are encouraged to add enabling amendments to their constitutions before
enacting new legislation. In Kentucky, for example, an amendment
was passed to authorize differential taxation in consolidated citycounty governments prior to the creation of the Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government.'
This preventive measure was
designed to protect the legislation from subsequent attacks based
upon state constitutional grounds,"' but it did nothing to alleviate
the rigid limitations of the parent uniformity clause:' 6'
While additional amendment may temporarily solve an immediate
problem, it will not resolve the underlying difficulty of the restrictive
effect of the provision. It may, on the contrary, aggravate the problem
because a newly added exception, for instance, may create a negative
implication which further restricts the scope and flexibility of the
amended provision, setting the stage for the next round of
amendment.''

The net result is that the only certain resolution of any potential
conflicts between new differential taxation legislation and restrictive uniformity structures resides, unfortunately, in the form of yet
another amendment to the state constitution.' 6
160. Id. at 581, 360 S.W.2d at 456.
161. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Pulaski County Bd. of Equalization, 266 Ark. 64,
582 S.W.2d 942 (1979), discussed at note 72 supra. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee,
33 Wis. 2d 408, 431.32, 147 N.W.2d 633, 645 (1967):
In view of the unbroken precedents developed over the years concerning the same unaltered clause of the constitution, we cannot abandon stare decisis in this field of property taxation. We are governed not only by the logic of the previous opinions of the
court in this respect but by the weight of precedent, from which we see no reason to
deviate.
See generally Matthews, supra note 56, at 523.
162. Ky. CONST. § 172A.
163. See Jacobs v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 560 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Ky.
1978).
164. In Jacobs, for example, the court noted that the enabling amendment allowed for
differential rates of ad valorem taxes only. The court held that the differential tax rates for
personal property and severed mineral interests in the new taxing entity were not sanctioned
by the amendment and were therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 14.
165. Grad, supra note 85, at 16.
166. Two recent opinions from the Idaho Attorney General indicate that strict uniformity mandates continue to create serious mischief for new property tax programs. Voter
demands for property tax relief in that state resulted in a legislative initiative modeled after
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III.

CHOOSING A METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

This analysis of the various reasons both for and against constitutional regulation of the taxing power permits the establishment of certain guidelines for changing existing uniformity structures in state constitutions to accommodate new demands for
preferential taxation programs. An underlying principle, however,
is that every state is unique, both in its governmental concerns'67
and in its philosophy toward constitutional limitations on the
power of taxation.16 8 Consequently, this discussion must be limited
to an enumeration of the various approaches to be considered when
reforming the uniformity provisions of state constitutions.
First, when the presence of frequent, narrowly drawn amendments reveals that the uniformity limitaton no longer serves con-.
temporary needs, the constitutional provision should be repealed. " ,
The noticeable pattern by which uniformity mandates erode in
piecemeal fashion to allow for preferential treatment of both rural
lands "7 ' and urban landmarks," ' and to promote such disparate policies as the redevelopment of urban slums"7 and the production of
solar energy,' suggests that strict limitations no longer serve a
useful function. The legislature, by repealing overly restrictive uniformity clauses, can be regranted the discretion to shape effective
tax policy. Any abuses of this discretion can still be checked by
state and federal equal protection clauses, which stand as barriers
to patently arbitrary classification schemes and unjust laws.' As
California's Proposition 13. See IDAHO CODE § 63-923 (1979). One of the provisions limits
assessed valuations for property tax purposes to 1978 market values adjusted annually to
reflect inflation but only at a rate not to exceed 2% per year. IDAHO CODE § 63-923(2)(b)
(1979). The attorney general concluded that the 2% limitation "would, in times of higher
actual inflation, result in such a great discrepancy between the actual, current value of property and the assessed value" that the just valuation requirement of the state's uniformity
clause would be violated. 79-16 Ops. IDAHO ATrY. GEN. -, - (1979). In another decision,
the attorney general noted that two parcels of property identical in value in 1978 may vary
considerably in subsequent years due to such factors as a change in the desirability of locations. He concluded that the similar treatment of these dissimilarly situated pieces of property under the 2% rule may violate the mandate for equality found in the state's uniformity
provision. 78-37 OPs. IDAHO ATTY. GEN. 148, 156 (1978). In both opinions, the attorney general relied on previous Idaho Supreme Court decisions giving strict interpretations to the
state's uniformity clauses. See note 73 supra.
167. See Grad, supra note 9, at 940-42.
168. See Matthews, supra note 6; Newhouse, supra note 6.
169. Grad, supra note 85, at 16.
170. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. 7, § 11.
171. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 8; LA. CONST. art. 7, § 18(C).
172. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 7; N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1, 6.
173. See, e.g., VA. CoNsT. art. 10, § 6 (d).
174. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 6, at 601-08. See generally McMurray, supra note 12,
at 221-22. State and federal due process clauses may also be used to challenge property tax
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long as the legislature stays within these broader constitutional
boundaries, however, it can adapt to new and different situations
by revising 75state revenue laws to keep pace with changes in public
1

sentiment.

Unfortunately, this approach stands little chance of success. If
history is a proper guide, the possibility of such broad-based constitutional reform is slight. Newhouse pointed out in his 1959 study
that no state with a uniformity clause had ever removed that
clause without enacting a substitute provision.1 76 Moreover, as
noted above, proponents of a constitutional amendment allowing
for preferential treatment of specific kinds of property are not
likely to risk defeat by arguing in the alternative for repeal of the
overly restrictive parent uniformity clause. 177 The safest approach
from their perspective is to advocate the adoption of a narrower,
less controversial exception to the general constitutional limitation.
The second best approach, in view of the proper form and
function of state constitutions, is to replace a rigid uniformity
structure with a provision that states in general terms the degree of
uniformity required by law. 178 A significant degree of constitutional
flexibility can be assured by explicit recognition of the legislative
right to classify property for the purpose of taxation. 17, While this
approach concedes that legislators cannot abide by the perfectionism demanded from strict uniformity mandates, it also serves to
guarantee that this concession will not result in numerous constitutional amendments to existing uniformity provisions. Moreover,
state legislatures would remain free to respond to public pressures
for new tax programs that draw relevant distinctions between different kinds of property.
classification statutes. Compare Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979) (invalidating farmland assessment statute creating an irrebuttable presumption that land for
which the owner had recorded a subdivision plat was nonagricultural) with Property Appraisal Dep't v. Ransom, 84 N.M. 637, 506 P.2d 794 (1973) (upholding "green belt" law
distinguishing between subdivided and unsubdivided agricultural land).
175. Uniformity clauses are absent in the state constitutions of Alaska, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Iowa, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Three of these jurisdictions-Hawaii,
New York, and Vermont-have implemented innovative statewide land use programs combining differential taxation with regulatory controls over the development of open space
land. For discussions of the Hawaii and Vermont programs, see D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 269-391 (1968). For a discussion of the New York program, see Myers, supra note 5.
176. NEWHOUSE, supra note 6, at 636.
177. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
178. Grad, supra note 85, at 16, 28. See generally NEWHOUSE, supra note 6, at 768-70.
179. See, e.g., Ky. CoNST. § 171; OKLA. CoNST. art. 10, § 22. The right to classify can
also be implicitly recognized by constitutional provisions providing that taxes shall be uniform within each class of subjects. See, e.g., COLO. CoNST. art. 10, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. X,
§ 1; OR. CONsr. art. 9, § 1.
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In addition, this approach allows state courts to play a more
meaningful role in reviewing the constitutionality of differential tax
legislation. They would no longer be forced to choose between the
unfortunate extremes of either invalidating politically popular tax
programs's" or upholding the legislation on the basis of strained interpretations of existing constitutional provisions."'1 Instead, the
courts could focus their inquiry on the relationship between the
legislative classification and the purpose of the tax statute. In Elwell v. County of Hennepin,' for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a "green acres" statute despite challenges
baged upon the state's uniformity clause. The Minnesota provision
required all taxes to be uniform upon the same class of subjects. 3
The court held that this clause permitted classification of property
for tax purposes if it was fairly done.' The court further stated
that it would not disturb the legislative determination unless the
classification was clearly arbitrary and had no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the law.' It noted that the "green acres"
law was designed to equalize tax burdens on agricultural property
within the state.' The statute provided for farmland to be as8 7
sessed on a basis which did not consider nonagricultural factors.
The court held that this classification allowed for valuation of
farmland in urban areas by standards that were similar to those
used to assess agricultural land in rural areas.' Thus, the court
concluded that a legitimate purpose justified the difference in tax
treatment between agricultural land and all other kinds of real
property.
The Minnesota court's standard of review in Elwell resembles
the standard used by federal courts reviewing tax legislation under
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution." 9 As
noted previously, this approach requires almost complete deference
180. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967),
discussed at notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 Ill. 2d 402, 372 N.E.2d 74 (1977), discussed at
notes 116-21 supra and accompanying text; Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 360 S.W.2d 449
(1962), discussed at notes 150-59 supra and accompanying text.
182. 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974).
183. MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1.
184. 301 Minn. at 76, 221 N.W.2d at 546-47.
185. Id. at 74, 221 N.W.2d at 546.
186. Id. at 76, 221 N.W.2d at 546.
187. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111 (West Supp. 1980).
188. 301 Minn. at 76, 221 N.W.2d at 546.
189. See id. at 75, 221 N.W.2d at 546. "The provisions of Minn. Const. art. 9, § 1, are
no more restrictive upon legislative power to tax or classify than is the equal protection
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If the statute here
involved does not violate one, it does not violate the other." Id.
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to legislative judgment on the matter of appropriate classifications
in tax initiatives."' The presence of a separate uniformity provision
in a state constitution may influence some courts to conduct a
more serious inquiry into the relationship between a new tax law
and its stated or implied purpose. At the same time, however, such
efforts could put in motion those forces that work to erode rigid
uniformity provisions beyond recognition. The experience in South
Dakota is particularly noteworthy. That state's uniformity clause
recognizes a legislative right to classify property for taxing purposes
but also requires that taxes be uniform upon all property of the
same class."' In Simmons v. Ericson,"' the state supreme court invalidated legislation setting limitations on the tax rate for agricultural land to support local school districts. The court concluded
that there was no legitimate purpose of taxation for local schools
that would permit the distinction made between agricultural land
and all other real property within a school district."3
The South Dakota legislature responded to the Ericson decision by proposing a constitutional amendment enabling it to classify agricultural land for the purpose of school taxation." 4 The
amendment was adopted by a substantial majority of those voting
on the proposal in the general elections of the following year, and
the legislature soon reenacted the differential tax law favoring
farmland." 5 In a subsequent challenge to the new statute, the state
supreme court reversed itself and concluded that the law was a rational one."' The court noted that with the advent of the new constitutional amendment, the law could be invalidated only if it conflicted with the federal equal protection clause."' The court seemed
as sensitive to the strong public sentiment favoring the differential
tax legislation as it was to the narrower standard of review for tax
legislation adopted by federal courts:
This court in 1929 could see no proper distinction between agricultural
land and other real estate for the purpose of school taxation. However,
in 1923 and again in 1931 the State Legislature saw a distinction, and in
1930 the people of this state saw the distinction so plainly that they
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were willing to write it into the Constitution of this state. . . . We can
no longer abide by the decision in Simmons v. Ericson, in so far as its
language relates to the application of the Federal Constitution to the
facts now before us. Since 1929 the severity of the adverse conditions
affecting agriculture in this state, of which we are now fully aware,
makes complete our realization that this court failed to see in 1929 that
which was apparently then plainly visible to the Legislature and the
people. . . . True, a general economic depression has affected all business and industry, but the Legislature in making this present classification is presumed to have acted upon adequate information, and from
what we know of general conditions in South Dakota we cannot say that
the classification is either unreasonable or arbitrary. " "

Thus, a significant and perhaps unforeseeable change in the economic and social condition of the state persuaded the South Dakota court to recognize a greater degree of discretion in the legislature to deal with a new situation. The court now seemed quite
willing to accept as true the legislature's determination that agricultural land could not bear the same tax burden for supporting
local schools as other property in the same school district.19 ' This
example illustrates that strict interpretations of uniformity provisions allowing for reasonable classifications can provoke constitutional changes that will effectively remove tax legislation from serious scrutiny by state courts.
Finally, if existing strict uniformity provisions cannot be
changed and amendments are still deemed necessary, then the
amendments should be drafted in language that is broad enough to
provide maximum flexibility for state legislatures confronted with
popular pressures to enact differential tax legislation."' They
should avoid the unnecessary procedural detail and the restrictive
terminology that foster further amendment.'"' In addition, they
should be permissive rather than mandatory in nature, allowing
the legislature several alternative methods for implementing the
constitutional directive."'2 For example, an open space amendment
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should simply regrant to the legislature the power to define open
space land and make special provisions for the taxation of such areas.y3 This approach would authorize state legislatures to carve out
by statute special exceptions to the general rule of uniformity as
public sentiment may demand. Consequently, lawmakers would
not be required to place every new differential tax program upon
its own specific constitutional foundation.
The problem nevertheless remains that any change in current
uniformity structures short of repeal will be accompanied by all of
the assorted risks inherent in constitutional control over the power
to tax property. Due to the negative implications raised by specific
exceptions to constitutional limitations, for example, the presence
of even a well-drafted open space amendment can hamper efforts
by the legislature to enact differential tax legislation for the preservation of historic landmarks or the promotion of urban redevelopment.2 4 The second best solutions offered here are designed only to
provide some assurance that revisions of existing constitutional regulations can be kept to a minimum. 2 5 The problems associated
with such regulations are bound to persist until the authority to
formulate revenue laws in accordance with the pressing needs of
government is fully regranted to state legislatures.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The experience with strict uniformity provisions and their numerous amendments would seem to suggest that severe constitutional tax limitations will eventually give way to piecemeal exceptions if the restrictions unreasonably interfere with legislative
efforts to deal with contemporary problems.2 8 In the late 1800s, a
basic distrust of the legislatures' plenary powers to raise revenue
led to the adoption of rigid limitations on the power of taxation,
including the uniformity mandates. In many jurisdictions, these
provisions effectively prohibited the classification of property for
spelled out in the constitution. Grad, supra note 9, at 971. It should be noted, however, that
courts may find it very difficult to enforce any mandatory provisions of a self-executing nature. See, e.g., Client Follow-up Co. v. Hynes, 75 Ill. 2d 208, 390 N.E.2d 847 (1979). See
generally Dodd, JudiciallyNon-Enforceable Provisionsof Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 54
(1931).
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the purpose of tax legislation. Recent generations have concluded
that these limitations are now too inflexible and counterproductive.
They have adopted amendments to the uniformity provisions regranting to the legislatures the authority to enact special laws in
certain circumstances. Unfortunately, because of their narrow focus, these additional layers of constitutional regulations have far
too often simply added to the inflexiblity of existing constitutional
7
norms.20
In the final analysis, the history of strict uniformity mandates
in state constitutional law serves to illustrate that the ultimate
check on legislative indiscretion lies in the general limitations of
the federal constitution and in public opinion.0 8 By attempting to
regulate taxation in our state constitutions, we have only aggravated the restrictive nature of these documents. If such limitations
are deemed necessary, they are best left to the statute books. Public opinion can then be channeled through our legislative institutions instead of our fundamental law. This objective cannot be
completely realized, however, until we are willing to give to our
legislatures the full authority and the final responsibility to formulate tax policy.
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